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A REALISTIC LOOK AT THE VICE PRESIDENCY: WHY DICK 
CHENEY IS AN “ENTITY WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH” 
INTRODUCTION 
Few would argue that the office of the Vice President has remained 
stagnant over the course of American history.  What began as a weak 
institution whose primary duty was to preside over the Senate1 has blossomed 
into a position of international reach and influence.2  The office owes its 
success not only to the men who have occupied the post, but also to the 
Presidents who have advanced its role in government.  It has been with the 
permission and cooperation of their Presidents that the Vice Presidents of 
today participate in “some of the most important decisions for the country’s 
policies.”3 
But despite the office’s close connection to the Commander in Chief, Vice 
President Richard B. Cheney has declared that the office is “not . . . an entity 
within the executive branch,” and therefore not subject to executive orders.4  
Instead, his advisors argue that since he is the President of the Senate, he is 
also a part of the Legislature.5  The statement was attacked by news 
columnists,6 lambasted by internet bloggers,7 and ridiculed by late night 
 
 1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4; see also infra text accompanying notes 62, 67–68. 
 2. Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 811, 812 (2005). 
 3. 110 CONG. REC. S8277 (daily ed. June 22, 2007) (statement of Sen. Durbin). 
 4. Letter from J. William Leonard, Dir. of the Info. Sec. Oversight Office, Nat’l Archives 
and Records Admin., to David S. Addington, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to the 
Vice President (June 8, 2006), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/200706210 
95027.pdf. 
 5. See Scott Shane, Agency Is Target in Cheney Fight on Secrecy Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 
22, 2007, at A1. 
 6. See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., A Vice President Without Borders, Bordering on 
Lunacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2007, § 4, at 15 (“[I]t’s quite a leap to go from hiding in a secure, 
undisclosed location in the capital to hiding in a secure, undisclosed location in the 
Constitution.”); Frank Rich, Op-Ed., When the Vice President Does It, that Means It’s Not Illegal, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, § 4, at 12. 
 7. See, e.g., Steven Taylor, The Office of the Vice President Does Not Consider Itself an 
“Entity Within the Executive Branch,” on PoliBlog, http://www.poliblogger.com/?p=12133 (June 
21, 2007) (“The assertion that the veep’s office is not part of the executive branch is perhaps the 
most absurd thing that I have heard in some time.”).  Others even believed that Cheney’s 
statement was evidence that he committed fraud.  See Posting of Mitchell W. Berger & Gregory 
A. Haile to ACSBlog, Guest Blogger: Cheney’s Claims Could Expose Him to Suit, 
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comedians.8  Senator Dick Durbin declared, “It is hard to imagine the tortured 
logic Vice President Cheney is using to avoid the requirements of the law and 
Executive orders.”9 
What makes Cheney’s statement seem so absurd to so many people?  After 
all, some of the nation’s Founding Fathers, including Thomas Jefferson and 
John Adams, considered the office to be “constitutionally confined to 
legislative functions.”10  Aside from being the President’s successor, the 
Constitution gives the Vice President only one official role: to preside over the 
Senate where he can cast the tie-breaking vote during deadlocks.11  
Furthermore, the Framers deliberately placed this duty in Article I with the 
Legislature, not in Article II with the Executive.12  Clearly they believed that 
the Vice President’s constitutional duties belonged to the Senate and the 
Legislative Branch.13  One might therefore contend that Cheney’s statement 
has substance within the framework of the Constitution and the intentions of its 
drafters. 
During the twentieth century, however, “the vice presidency . . . evolved 
into a position of new importance.”14  Cheney in particular has been called the 
most powerful Vice President in the nation’s history.15  His influence in the 
Bush Administration touches everything from energy concerns and foreign 
policy to editing tax proposals and refereeing cabinet disputes.16  In response to 
Cheney’s claim that he is not part of the Executive Branch and therefore not 
bound by executive orders, White House press spokeswoman Dana Perino 
commented, “This is an interesting constitutional question that legal scholars 
 
http://www.acsblog.org/separation-of-powers-guest-blogger-cheneys-claims-could-expose-him-
to-suit.html (July 5, 2007, 12:53 EST) (“[I]f he continued to maintain his position [Cheney] may 
have committed a fraud . . . when he asserted that he was a member of the Executive Branch.”). 
 8. See, e.g., The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast June 
22, 2007). 
 9. 110 CONG. REC. S8277 (daily ed. June 21, 2007) (statement of Sen. Durbin). 
 10. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry (May 13, 1797), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 119, 120 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1896). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
505, 515 (1995). 
 14. JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 13 (1982). 
 15. See Jo Becker & Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency: A Strong Push 
from Backstage, WASH. POST, June 26, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter A Strong Push]; Nightline: 
Cheney Wields Unprecedented V.P. Power (ABC television broadcast Nov. 29, 2003) 
(“[Cheney’s] power is unparalleled in the history of the republic, frankly, for that position.” 
(statement of John Hulsman, research fellow at The Heritage Foundation)). 
 16. See A Strong Push, supra note 15. 
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can debate.”  White House Press Secretary Tony Snow also stated, “It is a 
wonderful academic question. . . .”17 
But it is dangerous to trivialize Cheney’s statement as an academic 
exercise among legal scholars.18  His actions tread on one of the Constitution’s 
most sacred principles—the separation of powers.19  “Congress has a 
responsibility under the Constitution to conduct oversight of the executive 
branch.”20  In a letter to the Vice President, Representative Henry Waxman 
called Cheney’s decision to exempt his office from the Executive Branch 
“problematic because it could place national security secrets at risk.”21  The 
concern for Cheney’s statement, therefore, is not limited to the obscure realm 
of constitutional academia.  Rather, it is a concern for all Americans who have 
witnessed the government’s response to national security, environmental 
issues, the energy crisis, and economic recession. 
This Comment does not propose amendments to the Constitution or try to 
fix an office that has been criticized as “fundamentally flawed.”22  Instead, this 
Comment attempts to answer a more basic question: To which branch of 
government does Vice President Cheney belong?  I argue that although the 
office began as a Constitutional anomaly, located somewhere between both the 
Legislative and Executive Branches, it has gradually migrated into the latter.  
Part I discusses the historical context of the office and the Founding Fathers’ 
original intentions.  Part II examines the changing view of the office, 
particularly during the twentieth century when Presidents began to give their 
Vice Presidents more executive duties.  I argue that the Twenty-Fifth 
 
 17. AM: Cheney ‘A Law unto Himself’ (Australian Broadcasting Corp. radio broadcast June 
27, 2007), available at http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2007/s1963294.htm. 
 18. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 9 (“Such indifference among scholars may once have 
been appropriate.  It no longer is.  Compelling arguments justify a detailed consideration of the 
vice presidency.”). 
 19. See SAUL K. PADOVER, TO SECURE THESE BLESSINGS 333 (1962) (“If it be essential to 
the preservation of liberty that the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers be separate, it is 
essential to a maintenance of the separation that they should be independent of each other.” 
(attributing the comment to James Madison)). 
 20. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Administration Oversight, 
http://oversight.house.gov/investigations.asp?ID=101 (last visited Dec. 15, 2008). 
 21. Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 
to Richard Cheney, U.S. Vice President (June 21, 2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/ 
documents/20070621093952.pdf. 
 22. Richard D. Friedman, Some Modest Proposals on the Vice-Presidency, 86 MICH. L. REV. 
1703, 1705 (1988).  Friedman identifies “three basic problems with the vice-presidency: the 
method of nomination, the method of election, and the office itself.”  Id. at 1703.  Friedman then 
proposes three solutions: that the Vice President hold another office of significance within the 
Executive Branch, that the Vice President be separately nominated, and that the Vice President be 
separately elected.  Id. at 1705.  For a counterargument, see Goldstein, supra note 13, at 549–59, 
arguing that Friedman’s proposals are “fundamentally at odds with the vision behind the Twenty-
fifth Amendment.” 
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Amendment’s realistic approach not only envisioned a stronger Vice President, 
but also one firmly rooted within the Executive Branch.23  Finally, Part III 
applies these lessons to Cheney’s Vice Presidency.  This Comment concludes 
by critiquing Cheney’s statement as a futile attempt to remove himself 
nominally from the branch in which he is realistically entrenched both by his 
activism in the White House and by the Constitution. 
I.  THE ORIGINAL VICE PRESIDENCY 
“[U]nder the Constitution, I have legislative responsibilities.  I’m actually paid 
by the Senate, not by the Executive.  I sit as the President of the Senate, as the 
presiding officer in the Senate.  I cast tie-breaking votes in the Senate.”24 
At its heart, Cheney’s argument is based upon an understanding that the 
Framers of the Constitution intended the office of the Vice President to be 
situated in the Legislative Branch of government.  The strength of this 
argument necessarily relies upon the belief that the Constitution should be 
interpreted according to what the document meant to the generation that 
originally drafted and ratified it.25 
A. Framers’ Original Intent 
The Founding Fathers did not want the office of the Vice President.26  
Even in his defense of the institution, Alexander Hamilton begins by admitting 
that the Vice Presidency was “objected to as superfluous, if not 
mischievous.”27  Why then was it created?  The most obvious purpose of the 
Vice President was to provide a “substitute for the president,” since there 
needed to be some line of succession should the President be unable to fulfill 
 
 23. See generally Goldstein, supra note 13, at 523–40 (demonstrating the growth of the Vice 
Presidency and the differences between what the Founding Fathers and the Framers of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment envisioned for the office). 
 24. CBS Radio News: VP Dick Cheney on Gonzales, Libby, Iraq (CBS radio broadcast July 
30, 2007) [hereinafter Cheney Interview], available at http://audio.cbsnews.com/2007/07/30/ 
audio3113288.mp3 (statement of Richard Cheney); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (“The 
Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, 
unless they be equally divided.”). 
 25. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 
542 (1999).  Originalists would argue that the purpose of the Constitution is to prevent change.  
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 40 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 26. See PADOVER, supra note 19, at 392 (attributing the comment to Hugh Williamson). 
 27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 347 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). 
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his duties.28  But there were other ways to choose a successor to the 
President.29   
Professor Joel Goldstein suggests that the office provided both a means of 
presidential succession and a solution to presidential elections.30  Early in the 
debates, it was agreed that the President would be chosen by special electors 
from each state.31  Each elector was to vote “for two Persons, of whom one at 
least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves.”32  The 
person with the most votes would become President, and the runner-up would 
be the Vice President.33  The Framers feared that unless their second votes had 
some significance, electors would strategically throw one of their votes so that 
a candidate from their home state would prevail.34  Thus, the Vice President 
“was introduced merely for the sake of a valuable mode of election which 
required two to be chosen at the same time.”35 
The delegates did not discuss the function of the Vice President until the 
closing days of the Convention.36  Even then, little was apparently said.37  
Nonetheless, their silence may speak volumes about their intentions for the 
office.  Early in the debates, it was agreed that executive power would be 
vested in a single President.38  Giving the “next highest after the President”39 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 4 (noting that there were suggestions at the 
Constitutional Convention to have the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court become the successor 
to the President). 
 30. See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 512. 
 31. See PADOVER, supra note 19, at 351–52. 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 33. Joel K. Goldstein, An Overview of the Vice-Presidency, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 786, 789 
(1977). 
 34. See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 512; see also PADOVER, supra note 19, at 359 (“The 
only objection which occurred was that each citizen, after having given his vote for his favorite 
fellow-citizen, would throw away his second on some obscure citizen of another state in order to 
ensure the object of his first choice.” (attributing the comment to James Madison)).  Some 
delegates, however, believed that the partiality of each state for their own favorite son served a 
useful purpose.  JULES WITCOVER, FROM ADAMS AND JEFFERSON TO TRUMAN AND QUALYE: 
CRAPSHOOT—ROLLING THE DICE ON THE VICE PRESIDENCY 15 (1992) (“Let the people of each 
State choose its best Citizen.” (quoting John Dickinson)). 
 35. PADOVER, supra note 19, at 392 (attributing the comment to Hugh Williamson). 
 36. Goldstein, supra note 33, at 789 (noting that the “[c]reation of the Vice-Presidency was 
an afterthought”). 
 37. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 510. 
 38. See PADOVER, supra note 19, at 330–31 (indicating that the idea of a single Executive 
was approved at the Convention on June 4, 1787).  A single President was not appealing to all of 
the delegates.  See id. at 327–31.  Edmund Randolph vigorously argued for three executives, 
regarding unity as “the foetus of monarchy.”  Id. at 328.  This lingering threat of a monarchy 
loomed in the hearts of some of the delegates while they discussed the role of a Vice President.  
See id. at 392 (noting that George Mason “was averse to vest so dangerous a power in the 
President alone”). 
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any official role in the Executive Branch, therefore, might have threatened the 
concept of unity.  The Vice President was to be the runner-up of a competitive 
election, and there would naturally be some animosity between two of the 
nation’s most prominent leaders.40  If too much power was shared within the 
Executive Branch, “the most bitter dissentions [would be] apt to spring,” which 
would “lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans 
and operations of those whom they divide.”41  Thus, the delegates’ silence 
regarding the role of the Vice President in the Executive Branch indicates their 
caution in giving the office too much constitutional authority. 
This is not to say that the Framers wanted the Vice President removed 
entirely from view.  After all, he naturally carried a “weighty role” as the 
potential successor to the President.42  They thought it necessary then to give 
him “at least one official function.”43  In a vote of eight to two the delegates 
finally agreed that the Vice President would be, ex officio, the President of the 
Senate.44  This was a relatively meaningless position, which even the Framers 
knew would be a “no-show job.”45  Although the role appeared largely 
inconsequential, it conveniently solved one dilemma facing the delegates.  
Because there were an even number of senators, it was necessary for there to 
be a president of the assembly to cast a tie-breaking vote during deadlock.46  
Removing one state’s senator in order that he may be the presiding officer 
would weaken that state’s representation; therefore, it was necessary to bring 
in someone else.47 
Nonetheless, the Vice President’s role in the Senate created controversy.48  
One of the greatest concerns confronting the Founding Fathers was to preserve 
the fundamental principle of separation of powers that they had worked so hard 
to promote.49  By its nature, some believed that the office of the Vice President 
would be “an encroachment on the rights of the Senate” that would “mix[] too 
 
 39. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 576 
(W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1840). 
 40. See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 516. 
 41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 27, at 357. 
 42. Albert, supra note 2, at 820. 
 43. Id. at 821. 
 44. PADOVER, supra note 19, at 391–92. 
 45. Friedman, supra note 22, at 1707–08; see Goldstein, supra note 13, at 512 (“This role 
seems at most an incidental benefit of the office, a ready chore so the Vice President could earn 
his keep.”). 
 46. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 27, at 347. 
 47. PADOVER, supra note 19, at 392 (“[S]ome member by being made President must be 
deprived of his vote . . . .” (attributing the comment to Roger Sherman)); see THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 68, supra note 27, at 347. 
 48. See PADOVER, supra note 19, at 391–92. 
 49. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 515. 
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much the legislative and the executive.”50  Moreover, the anti-Federalists of the 
group feared that the Executive Branch would be too strong and might 
overpower the Legislature through the Vice Presidency.51  One delegate 
quipped, “We might as well put the President himself at the head of the 
legislature.”52  This suggests that these delegates believed the office was 
rightfully an executive position being forced upon the Legislature. 
The fruit of the deliberations at the 1787 Constitutional Convention was an 
institution whose purposes were rooted in the Executive Branch, but whose 
duties were legislative.  The Vice President was therefore situated in both 
branches, but welcome at neither address.53  The Founders’ reservations 
toward creating the office no doubt resulted in a weak institution riddled with 
ambiguity.54  It is not surprising, then, that problems soon arose. 
B. Problems that Arose with the Vice Presidency 
1. Impotence of the Office 
The office of the Vice President was initially filled by very capable 
leaders.55  John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, both of whom would later 
become Presidents, were the first two to fill the spot.56  It was no accident.  The 
Founders carefully considered the qualifications for the second in line as they 
debated the method for choosing the Chief Executive.  In the Federalist Papers, 
Hamilton wrote, “[A]ll the reasons, which recommend the mode of election 
prescribed for the one, apply with great, if not with equal, force to the manner 
of appointing the other.”57  But the first Vice Presidents approached the office 
with reluctance and hesitation, realizing that their actions would have a 
profound impact on the operations of the office well into the future.58 
Adams was particularly wary of intruding upon the President’s executive 
authority.59  He attended few cabinet meetings and advised the President only 
upon occasion.60  Consequently, his influence in Washington’s Administration 
was limited more to the Executive Branch’s ceremonial undertakings than 
 
 50. PADOVER, supra note 19, at 392 (attributing the comment to George Mason IV). 
 51. Albert, supra note 2, at 825. 
 52. PADOVER, supra note 19, at 391 (attributing the comment to Elbridge Gerry). 
 53. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 508. 
 54. Id. at 518. 
 55. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 6. 
 56. Id. 
 57. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 27, at 347. 
 58. See MARK O. HATFIELD, VICE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–1993, at 17 
(Wendy Wolff ed., 1997). 
 59. Id. at 6–7. 
 60. Id. at 6. 
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policy determinations.61  Instead, Adams focused on his role as President of the 
Senate, stating that the Vice President was “totally detached from the executive 
authority and confined to the legislative.”62  In his capacity as President of the 
Senate, Adams cast twenty-nine tie-breaking votes, far more than any Vice 
President since.63  Yet, even as head of the Legislature, Adams was frustrated 
by the limitations of his office.64  The task of presiding rather than debating 
was not quite adapted to his character.65  “[M]y country has in its wisdom 
contrived for me,” he stated, “the most insignificant office that ever the 
invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived.  And as I can do 
neither good nor evil, I must be borne away by others, and meet the common 
fate.”66 
Jefferson, too, realized the impotence of the Vice Presidency.  Having 
fundamentally different views from Adams, who had defeated him in the 1796 
election, Jefferson was not interested in being the Chief Executive’s assistant.67  
Instead, Jefferson confined his role in government to that of President of the 
Senate, where he promised to approach his duties “with more confidence” than 
his predecessor.68  Nonetheless, Jefferson could not stop Adams and the 
Federalists from pushing through legislation that Jefferson believed violated 
the Constitution.69  When he called for the states themselves to nullify the 
federal laws, Jefferson was only able to muster support from the legislatures of 
his home state Virginia and neighboring Kentucky, both of which modified 
what they believed to be his rather extreme rhetoric.70 
The point of illustrating the first two Vice Presidencies here is not to 
criticize their failure to contribute to American politics.  Indeed, both Adams 
and Jefferson served as leaders of their respective parties, which in and of itself 
indicates their contributions. Rather, the first two Vice Presidencies 
demonstrate how the office was an ineffective means of wielding political 
power.  Without presidential backing or executive authority, the Vice President 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 7. 
 63. See Senate Historical Office, Occasions When Vice Presidents Have Voted to Break Tie 
Votes in the Senate (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/ 
resources/pdf/VPTies.pdf. 
 64. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 7; see also Goldstein, supra note 13, at 519 (“[T]he office 
was a sinecure, a prescription for frustration for the nation’s second citizen.”). 
 65. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 7. 
 66. 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 460 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little, Brown 
& Co. 1856). 
 67. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 20–21. 
 68. Id. at 20. 
 69. See id. at 23. 
 70. See id. at 23–24. 
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was no more than a “constitutional luxury,”71 even for men who had 
substantial political clout.72  The formation of political parties during the 1790s 
would reduce the Vice President’s political standing even further.73 
2. Political Weaknesses 
As early as the 1790s, the politics of the nation were substantially different 
from that desired by the delegates of the Constitutional Convention.74  In his 
farewell address, President Washington discouraged the nation from creating 
political parties.75  Dependence on political allies undermined the competition 
among the branches that the Constitution had envisioned.76  Nonetheless, the 
rising tide of political factions was inevitable.  By 1796, parties had formed 
presidential tickets, designating one candidate for President and another for 
Vice President in the hopes of attracting more support from different regions of 
the country.77  The party system exposed one of the weaknesses in the 
Constitution and called for an amendment that left the Vice President as 
nothing more than a vestigial remnant of an obsolete design.78 
In the disastrous election of 1800, both Jefferson and Aaron Burr of the 
Republican ticket received the same number of electoral votes.79  The Framers 
had anticipated ties in the electorate and provided a remedy: “[I]f there be 
more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, 
 
 71. Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution, 
NEXUS, Spring 1997, at 11, 16; see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 146. 
 72. Adams and Jefferson are not the only examples of strong leaders who failed to win 
respect for the new office of the Vice Presidency.  Consider, for example, John C. Calhoun, a 
powerful congressman who had chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee during the War of 1812 
and served as President Monroe’s Secretary of War.  HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 85–86.  As 
Vice President, Calhoun could not convince President John Quincy Adams to stay out of South 
American affairs.  See id. at 88.  Even as a presiding officer during the “Golden Age of the 
Senate,” Calhoun failed to win respect for the office.  See id. at 84, 90 (“[I]t is not the duty, nor 
the right, of the President of the Senate to call a member to order.” (quoting John Randolph)). 
 73. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 6. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See George Washington, President of the United States, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 
1796), reprinted in 6 ANNALS OF CONG. app. 2869, 2873–74 (1796) (“[A]ll combinations and 
associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, 
counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities, are . . . of 
fatal tendency.”). 
 76. See Steven M. Pyser, Recess Appointments to the Federal Judiciary: An 
Unconstitutional Transformation of Senate Advice and Consent, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 61, 110 
(2006); see also PADOVER, supra note 19, at 363 (“[C]onsidering the powers of the President and 
those of the Senate, if a coalition should be established between these two branches, they will be 
able to subvert the Constitution.” (attributing the comment to George Mason IV)). 
 77. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 6. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
290 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:281 
then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of 
them for President . . . .”80  However, in the unlikely event of a tie,81 they had 
planned for a resolution between adversaries, not allies.82  Even Aaron Burr 
speculated that “[t]he Matter of V.P—is of very little comparative 
Consequence,” since the election would probably end with Jefferson as 
President and Adams as Vice President.83 
Although Jefferson eventually won the dispute by a vote in the House of 
Representatives, the country had come dangerously close to electing a man 
whom the people never wanted to be President.84  Thus, an amendment which 
provided a separate election for the Vice President and the President was 
proposed.85  However, some feared that the Vice President would become an 
office “worse than useless.”86  He would “not stand on such high ground in the 
method proposed as he” did in the previous system of a double ballot.87  
Consequently, they believed that the office would attract men of inferior 
quality.88  There were even attempts to abolish the office entirely.89  
Nonetheless, these attempts failed, and the Twelfth Amendment was ratified 
on September 25, 1804.90  Caught between two competing branches without 
any meaningful role in either, the office of the Vice President was struggling to 
survive past its infancy. 
3. Succession Under Article II 
If the primary purpose of the Vice Presidency—that of providing a means 
to secure a President—posed problems, so did the Vice President’s other 
purpose of providing a successor to the Commander in Chief.  This problem 
stemmed from the Framers’ ambiguous, if not careless, choice of words in 
drafting the Constitution.91  Article II states: “In Case of the Removal of the 
 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 81. See PADOVER, supra note 19, at 364 (“It is probable that a majority of the votes will fall 
on the same man; as each elector is to give two votes, more than one-fourth will give a majority.” 
(attributing the comment to Gouverneur Morris)). 
 82. See Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 312 (1999) 
(“Presidents did not hand-pick their Vice-Presidents, who were more likely to be rivals than 
partners.”). 
 83. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 35 (quoting Aaron Burr). 
 84. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 6. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. (quoting Roger Griswold). 
 87. Id. (quoting Samuel Taggart). 
 88. See id. at 6–7 (“[T]he vice-presidential nomination was awarded as a consolation prize to 
a defeated faction of a party.  The credentials of some nominees were ludicrous.”). 
 89. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 6. 
 90. Id. at 6–7. 
 91. See WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 17 (“The convention, ironically, seemed much more 
concerned with whether the vice president would serve as president of the Senate than with the 
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President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge 
the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice 
President . . . .”92 
But what does “the Same shall devolve” mean?  If “the Same” refers to 
“Powers and Duties,” then the Vice President would merely act as President 
until a successor was chosen.93  If “the Same” refers to “Office,” then the Vice 
President would in fact become President.94  Fortunately, the nation was not 
forced to decide the meaning until 1841, when the sudden death of William 
Henry Harrison launched Vice President John Tyler into the number one 
spot.95  Tyler believed that the Constitution meant to confer upon him not only 
the powers and duties, but also the title of President.96  When Harrison’s 
Cabinet, among others, complained of his usurpation, Tyler responded, “I am 
the President, and I shall be held responsible for my administration.”97 
Amid the growing popularity of Tyler’s new found epithet, “His 
Accidency,” Congress convened in a special meeting to resolve the issue.98  
One Congressman suggested the Legislature address Tyler as “Vice President 
now exercising the office of President.”99  Another envisioned a major struggle 
if a President were only temporarily disabled and later sought to resume 
power.100  However, Senator Calhoun reminded the Senate that this was not the 
current dilemma, and Congress adopted a resolution recognizing Tyler’s 
legitimate claim to the Presidency.101  This created “a new constitutional 
understanding” of the office,102 which gave the Vice Presidency more 
substance.  Should the number one spot become vacant, the Vice President 
would actually become President and not merely a temporary fix.  Eventually, 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment incorporated the “Tyler precedent” into the 
Constitution.103 
 
infinitely more important matter of his succession to the presidency if fate or circumstance 
dictated.”). 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 93. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 517.  Professor Goldstein argues: “The drafts of the 
pertinent provisions at the Constitutional Convention contained language that envisaged the Vice 
President as a substitute who might occasionally exercise presidential powers and duties, not as 
an officer who would become President.”  Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 142. 
 96. See id. at 143. 
 97. Id. (quoting John Tyler). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 144. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 522. 
 103. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1 (“In case of the removal of the President from office or of 
his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.”). 
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II.  THE MODERN VICE PRESIDENCY 
Despite the Vice President’s importance as successor to the President, until 
midway through the twentieth century, the office was useful only as a means of 
securing votes for presidential nominees.  Political parties were far less 
concerned with a vice presidential candidate’s qualifications to run the country 
than with the state that he called home.104  But the needs of the nation shifted, 
and the office adapted.  Modern Vice Presidents enjoy broad international 
reach and influence, often using the office as a “springboard to the 
Presidency.”105  President Franklin Roosevelt realized the importance of the 
Vice President when he stated: “While my heart and lungs are good and the 
other organs functioning along okay . . . nothing in life is certain. . . . It’s 
essential that the man who runs with me should be able to carry on.”106 
But the path to the modern Vice Presidency was not a smooth ride.  
Although the office has changed dramatically over the past two hundred years, 
these changes came in several increments.107  No single person created the 
modern Vice Presidency.  It was a confluence of factors including global 
events, constitutional amendments, and political forces that contributed to the 
office’s current state.108 
A. Roosevelt Sets the Stage for the Modern Vice President 
Recent Vice Presidents have shared a close political link with their 
Commanders in Chief.  But this was not always the case.  Until the mid-
twentieth century, the convention, not the President, picked vice presidential 
nominees.109  Party leaders generally looked for candidates who could balance 
the ticket, satisfy a party faction, or bring in key votes.110  They paid little 
attention to the pair’s personal and political compatibility.  Often, the chosen 
candidate reluctantly accepted the vice presidential nomination and approached 
 
 104. See HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 167 (attributing the fact that eight of the twenty-two 
Vice Presidents during the nineteenth century called New York home to the state’s high number 
of electoral votes). 
 105. Albert, supra note 2, at 812; see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 11 (“Occupants of the 
office in this century have almost invariably been considered presidential timber.”). 
 106. WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 76 (alteration in original) (quoting Jim Farley’s account of 
a conversation with Franklin D. Roosevelt). 
 107. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 8; see also Albert, supra note 2, at 812 (“There have 
been four pivotal constitutional moments in vice presidential history.”). 
 108. See Albert, supra note 2, at 831.  Vice presidential scholar Richard Albert divides the 
evolution of the office along three axes: substantive functions, structural components, and 
political purposes.  Id. 
 109. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 47. 
 110. Id. at 48. 
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the office with little enthusiasm.111  Additionally, presidential candidates were 
not always fond of their running mates, and some even viewed their Vice 
Presidents as political adversaries.112  Needless to say, the lack of a strong 
bond between the two did not help advance the stature of the Vice Presidency. 
But as the country found itself in the throes of depression and war, a new 
sense of national urgency allowed President Franklin Roosevelt to transform 
the Executive Branch and, necessarily, his relationship with the Vice 
President.113  The Founding Fathers had envisioned that Congress would create 
legislation, which the President would then enforce.114  Roosevelt reversed 
these roles.115  He became actively involved in initiating and seeking 
congressional support for legislation as part of his “New Deal.”116  The New 
Deal opened the flood gates that had been holding back the power of the 
Executive Branch. 
Roosevelt needed help to control the enormous growth of government 
activity.117  The Reorganization Act of 1939 allowed him to appoint assistants 
within the Executive Branch.118  But Roosevelt also needed a liaison between 
the White House and Capitol Hill, which he found in his Vice President, John 
Nance Garner.119  Although initially a reluctant candidate for Vice President, 
“Cactus Jack” immediately proved to be invaluable to the Roosevelt 
Administration.120  His long legislative experience and desire to impact 
Congressional decisions made him Roosevelt’s “political general,” leading the 
charge on Capitol Hill.121  Realizing the importance of Garner’s sway over the 
conservatives in Congress,122 Roosevelt made his Vice President an integral 
 
 111. Vice President Garret Hobart, for example, felt ambivalent about the honor of being 
nominated.  HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 290.  Others, like William Wheeler, even refused to 
campaign.  Id. at 245. 
 112. For example, President Ulysses S. Grant questioned the motivations of his Vice 
President, Schuyler Colfax, when Colfax returned from an alleged retirement from politics.  See 
id. at 227–28. 
 113. David K. Nichols, Congressional Dominance and the Emergence of the Modern 
Presidency: Was Congress Ever the First Branch of Government?, in SEPARATION OF POWERS 
AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 113, 113 (Bradford P. Wilson & Peter W. Schramm eds., 1994). 
 114. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 26–27. 
 115. Id. at 27. 
 116. See Nichols, supra note 113, at 113–14. 
 117. See JOHN HART, THE PRESIDENTIAL BRANCH FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 26 (2d 
ed. 1995). 
 118. Id. at 30. 
 119. See HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 388–89. 
 120. Id. at 385, 388. 
 121. Id. at 389. 
 122. Id. at 388 (“[T]he new vice president renewed political alliances with over twenty of his 
former colleagues . . . . [S]ome of them had become the leaders of the party’s conservative wing 
of southern and western Democrats, who held the key committee chairmanships.”). 
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part of his Administration.  He invited Garner to attend all cabinet meetings,123 
and frequently phoned him to solicit opinions about proposals for 
legislation.124  Garner often harbored personal opposition to some of the 
President’s political agenda, but he dutifully convinced reluctant lawmakers to 
support the President’s “good politics and good patriotism.”125 
Vice President Garner, however, did not forget his conservative ties to 
Congress.  When Roosevelt needed support for his attempt to pack the 
Supreme Court with more liberal justices, Garner showed his disapproval first 
by holding his nose and gesturing with a “thumbs down” when the plan was 
introduced, and then by going on “a vacation” with his wife when the Senate 
was about to vote on the proposal.126  “This is a fine time to jump ship,” fumed 
Roosevelt.127  The tension between the two reached a climax when Roosevelt 
ran for an unprecedented third term.  “No man should exercise the great 
powers of the presidency too long,” stated Garner.128  It was evident that if 
Roosevelt wanted another term, he would have to find a new running mate.129 
Roosevelt’s experience with Garner convinced him that he needed to find a 
Vice President with whom he shared the same ideologies, not just someone 
who would do his bidding in Congress.130  He found such a partner in Henry 
Wallace, and Roosevelt was adamant about having Wallace as his running 
mate.131  When it was brought to Roosevelt’s attention that the Democratic 
convention might not select Wallace for the vice presidential spot, he barked, 
“Well damn it to hell . . . they will go for Wallace or I won’t run, and you can 
jolly well tell them so.”132  Needless to say, Wallace was chosen.133  
Roosevelt’s personal role in selecting his running mate over the wishes of 
party leaders represented a huge shift in the vice presidential selection 
 
 123. WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 71. 
 124. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 388. 
 125. Id. at 389. 
 126. WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 73–74. 
 127. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 391. 
 128. WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 75. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 399. 
 131. See id.; WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 78 (“Henry’s not a mystic, he’s a philosopher, a 
liberal philosopher, and I’m sure that he’ll be all right.” (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt)). 
 132. WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 78 (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt). 
 133. See id. at 80.  Despite some dissention among party conservatives, who were concerned 
about Roosevelt being a three-term President, he won in a landslide over his competitors for the 
Democratic nomination.  See id. at 76 (“The vote was FDR 946, Farley 72, Garner 61, Senator 
Millard Tydings of Maryland 9, Secretary of State Cordell Hull 5.”). 
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process.134  The personal compatibility of the ticket became a major factor135—
a trend that would continue to this day.136 
B. A New Executive Officer 
Over the next several years, Vice Presidents assumed more executive 
duties.  With his eyes set on the war clouds over Europe, Roosevelt appointed 
Wallace as the chairman of the Economic Defense Board.137  Additionally, 
Wallace was the first Vice President to take an active role in foreign policy as 
the President’s personal ambassador to countries throughout South America, 
Europe, and Asia.138  Vice President Alben Barkley, under President Harry 
Truman,139 was given an ex officio membership to the National Security 
council.140 
As they took on more executive functions, Vice Presidents spent less time 
in Congress.141  With the array of new functions President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower had given him, it is no wonder that Vice President Richard Nixon 
found his constitutional role as presiding officer of the Senate dull.142  
Eisenhower gave Nixon both domestic and foreign projects,143 earning him a 
role as the President’s advisor in both policy and politics.144  As Eisenhower’s 
personal ambassador, Nixon traveled through fifty-four countries and met with 
forty-five heads of state during his eight years as Vice President.145  On the 
home front, Eisenhower used Nixon’s political savvy to broker deals with 
powerful senators who were trying to undermine the Administration.146  
Despite his active role in Eisenhower’s Administration, Nixon was careful not 
to usurp power when the President suffered a coronary attack.147  Nixon’s 
 
 134. See id. at 81. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Stephen Goode, Quayle Predicts Dole Will Pick a Governor, INSIGHT, Aug. 28, 
1995, at 12, 13 (“There ‘must be a comfort level between the president and the vice president’ 
that is genuine.” (quoting Dan Quayle)). 
 137. WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 81. 
 138. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 403. 
 139. See Robert H. Ferrell, Seasoned Politicians: Harry S. Truman and Alben W. Barkley as 
Vice Presidents, in AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIDE: THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 63, 63 (Timothy Walch ed., 1997). 
 140. Albert, supra note 2, at 833. 
 141. Barkley was the last Vice President to preside regularly over the Senate.  HATFIELD, 
supra note 58, at 427. 
 142. Id. at 442. 
 143. Albert, supra note 2, at 833. 
 144. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 438. 
 145. Id. at 442. 
 146. Id. at 438–39 (illustrating the methods Nixon used in handling the Bricker Amendment 
and the “McCarthy problem”). 
 147. Id. at 443. 
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ability “to provide leadership without appearing to lead” during this time was 
praised by even his sharpest critics.148 
C. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment Forges a New Vision of the Office 
President Eisenhower’s brush with death and President John F. Kennedy’s 
assassination once again brought the issue of succession to the forefront of 
national concern.149  The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was proposed to provide a 
smooth transition of power in the event of a presidential vacancy—whether by 
death, resignation, removal, or disability.150  Unlike the Framers of the original 
Constitution, the Framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment had the advantage 
of hindsight.151  They witnessed the failures of the original design for the Vice 
Presidency, and this experience put them in a much better position to fix the 
problems.152  Consequently, their perception of the office was far different 
from that of the Founding Fathers.153 
First, the Framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment saw the Vice President 
as the true successor to the President rather than a mere temporary 
replacement.154  Section 1 of the Amendment confirms the Tyler precedent,155 
stating: “In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or 
resignation, the Vice President shall become President.”156  This simply makes 
constitutional in text what was “constitutional in fact.”157  Before the adoption 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, every President who died in office was 
 
 148. Id. (quoting Richard Nixon). 
 149. See Richard M. Nixon, We Need a Vice President Now, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Jan. 
1, 1964, reprinted in Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice President: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
88th Cong. 238 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 Senate Hearings] (“It is a tragic fact that it took a 
terrible crime in Dallas to remind us of a serious defect in our constitutional process.  The murder 
of our President has forced us to reassess our law of succession and the office of the Vice 
President.”). 
 150. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 202. 
 151. See 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 149, at 22 (statement of Sen. Kenneth B. Keating, 
Member, S. Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments) (“The limits of human foresight can 
perhaps explain why the Founding Fathers left the glaring omissions and silences on Presidential 
inability we perceive today in article II of the Constitution.”). 
 152. See id. (statement of Sen. Kenneth B. Keating, Member, S. Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Amendments) (“Having had no operating experience, so to speak, under the novel institution of 
the Presidency which they were creating, it may well be that those wise statesmen counted upon 
the trial-and-error process of experience to galvanize their descendants into finally devising an 
adequate and lasting solution.”). 
 153. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 540. 
 154. Id. at 537. 
 155. JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND 
APPLICATIONS 193 (2d ed. 1992). 
 156. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 157. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 527. 
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succeeded by his Vice President under the Tyler precedent.158  Nonetheless, the 
Amendment was an important step toward securing the validity of the office 
and ensuring the Vice President’s status as the President’s rightful heir. 
Second, the Framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment saw the Vice 
Presidency as a necessary institution within the government.159  Their view of 
its importance is underscored by the mere fact that Section 2 of the 
Amendment provides a means of succession to the Vice Presidency160—
something the Framers at the 1787 Convention did not even consider during 
their debates.161  The Framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment had witnessed 
the growth of the office during the twentieth century, and they realized that it 
was indispensable.162  Senator Bayh referred to it as “the second most 
important office in the land,” and he emphasized its “resurgence and 
redevelopment” during the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations.163  
Senator Fong echoed the sentiments of the nation by proclaiming that “[n]o 
one in America today doubts that the Vice-Presidency is an office of 
paramount importance.”164  Former Vice President Richard Nixon even 
suggested that the office should continue to expand and assume greater 
responsibilities.165  Because the office had received more power from the Chief 
Executive, it was “no longer the ornamental office that it once was.”166 
Finally, the Framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment spoke of the Vice 
President increasingly as a member of the Executive Branch.167  While the 
 
 158. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 10 (listing vice presidential successors to the 
President). 
 159. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 149, at 2 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S. 
Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments) (“Why have a Vice President?  Hasn’t this office 
been the object of sharp satire since the Constitutional Convention created it as an 
afterthought? . . . Maybe so—once upon a time.  But no more—not in 20th century America.”). 
 160. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2; see also 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 149, at 1 
(statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments) (stating 
that the best way to preserve stability in the event that both a President and Vice President die 
within the same four year term is to “make certain that the Nation always has a Vice President as 
well as a President”). 
 161. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 526. 
 162. See FEERICK, supra note 155, at 33. 
 163. 110 CONG. REC. 22,986 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 164. Id. at 22,993 (statement of Sen. Fong). 
 165. See Nixon, supra note 149, at 238 (“Clearly there can be no reversal of this trend toward 
greater duties and responsibilities for the Vice President.”). 
 166. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 149, at 52 (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits). 
 167. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 531.  In fact, Senator Keating proposed that there be two 
Vice Presidents, one who discharged executive duties and another who discharged legislative 
duties.  1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 149, at 26–27 (statement of Sen. Kenneth B. Keating, 
Member, S. Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments).  This idea was rejected by others who 
felt that the Vice President should continue to grow in stature and that spreading the duties too 
thin would undermine this advancement.  See id. at 5 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S. 
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Founding Fathers only spoke of a “close intimacy,”168 there is no shortage of 
quotes from the debates over the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that indicate the 
Framers’ attitude toward the relationship between the Chief Executive and the 
Vice President.  In his opening statement before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments, Senator Bayh noted: 
The Vice President is today an integral part of Cabinet meetings.  Modern-day 
Presidents seek the advice and counsel of their Vice Presidents.  The Vice 
President is a statutory member of the National Security Council.  He is 
Chairman of the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.  
He is Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council.169 
Senator Jacob K. Javits would later add that the Vice President is “a worldwide 
traveler for American goodwill” who “must be kept abreast of the critically 
important knowledge and basis for decision which inhere in the Presidency.”170  
Representative Byron G. Rogers believed the Vice President worked more 
closely with the President than did any other cabinet member.171  Attorney 
General Nicholas Katzenbach even referred to the Vice Presidency as a “high 
command of the executive branch of the Government.”172  The point was clear 
to the Framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: by 1967 the Vice President 
had “become a full-fledged, working member of the executive branch.”173 
D. Moving the Vice Presidency to the Executive Branch 
The conception of this new Vice President, found within the vision of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, soon proved to be a reality.  Even as the 
Amendment was being drafted, Vice President Hubert Humphrey was taking 
the office to a new level of activism “as the busiest vice president in history 
during his first year in office.”174  President Johnson used Humphrey much like 
 
Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments); Nixon, supra note 149, at 237.  Moreover, the 
legislative Vice President would have practically no meaningful post as only the President of the 
Senate, and the office would attract men of inferior political stature.  See 1964 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 149, at 5 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Amendments). 
 168. See PADOVER, supra note 19, at 391 (attributing the comment to Elbridge Gerry). 
 169. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 149, at 2 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S. 
Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments). 
 170. Id. at 52 (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits). 
 171. Presidential Inability: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 159–
60 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of Rep. Byron G. Rogers, Member, H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 172. Id. at 108 (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, U.S. Att’y Gen.). 
 173. See 110 CONG. REC. 22,996 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 174. ALBERT EISELE, ALMOST TO THE PRESIDENCY: A BIOGRAPHY OF TWO AMERICAN 
POLITICIANS 235 (1972). 
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Roosevelt used Garner in persuading Congress to adopt his proposals.175  But it 
was clear that Humphrey was acting on behalf of Johnson and not as an 
independent legislative officer.176  Vice President Spiro Agnew also quickly 
discovered that he did not belong in the Senate when Senator Len Jordan 
scolded, “You can’t tell me how to vote!” sending Agnew back to try his luck 
in the White House. 177  Although Vice President Dan Quayle initially tried to 
take an active role in the Senate, he too found himself becoming more a part of 
the Executive than the Legislative Branch.178 
Soon after the ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Vice 
President became the President’s advisor in virtually all key decisions. 179  
Walter Mondale lobbied President Carter for a central role in his 
Administration.180  In response, Carter invited his Vice President to every 
meeting that he scheduled, allowing Mondale to choose those he wanted to 
attend.181  The two also shared a weekly luncheon to exchange ideas.182  To 
show that Mondale’s opinion mattered, Carter moved the Vice President’s 
office into the West Wing for easy and regular access—a significant step both 
practically and symbolically, continuing to this day.183  Mondale later 
explained, “[W]e entered our offices understanding—perhaps for the first time 
in the history of those offices—that each of us could do a better job if we 
maintained the trust of the other.”184 
That view of the relationship between the President and Vice President has 
persisted.  Despite President Ronald Reagan’s initial misgivings about Vice 
President George Herbert Walker Bush, the two had weekly luncheons so that 
Reagan could draw from Bush’s broad experience in politics and diplomacy.185  
When Bush became President in his own right, he invited Quayle “to become 
fully informed about every aspect of the presidency.”186  President Clinton and 
 
 175. See HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 469; supra text accompanying notes 113–25. 
 176. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 469. 
 177. ALLEN DRURY, COURAGE AND HESITATION 98–100 (1971). 
 178. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 549 (“From the viewpoint of the Executive Branch, I found 
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 181. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 522. 
 182. Id. 
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 186. Id. at 549. 
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Vice President Al Gore even presented themselves as a type of co-presidency 
in their bid for the White House,187 where Gore quickly took an active role in 
environmental issues188 and foreign policy.189  Indeed, the Vice Presidency has 
come a long way from being “constitutionally confined to legislative 
functions.”190  It is in the context of the modern Vice President under the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment that we must address the question of where Cheney 
belongs between the Executive and Legislative Branches. 
III.  CHENEY’S VICE PRESIDENCY 
In an interview with Mark Knoller of CBS Radio, Vice President Cheney 
stated that “the Vice President is kind of a unique creature . . . in that you’ve 
got a foot in both branches.”191  When pressed to state the branch to which he 
believes he principally belongs, Cheney responded, “Well, I suppose you could 
argue it either way.  The fact is I do work in both branches.  Under the 
Constitution, I’m assigned responsibilities in the Legislative Branch.  Then the 
President obviously gives me responsibilities in the Executive Branch.  And I 
perform both those functions . . . .”192  However, actions speak louder than 
words.  Cheney has represented himself as a member of the Executive Branch 
in three ways: functionally, politically, and constitutionally. 
A. Cheney as the Chief of Staff 
From the moment he took office, one of Cheney’s major concerns was 
giving the Vice Presidency more power.193  When former Vice President Dan 
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Quayle told him of the mundane duties of the office, Cheney replied with a 
smile, “I have a different understanding with the president.”194  His 
understanding is “that the vice president should be the chief of staff in effect, 
that everything should run through his office.”195  Having served as President 
Ford’s Chief of Staff, Cheney realized the potential power of the Vice 
President, if given the proper patron.196  President Bush has been more than 
willing to allow his Vice President to hammer out the finer details of executive 
projects.197  As Washington Post journalist Barton Gellman put it, “He doesn’t 
just advise, he operates.”198 
In fulfilling his constitutional responsibilities, Vice President Cheney has 
cast a tie-breaking vote in the Senate only eight times during his two term 
tenure.199  In contrast, his executive responsibilities are practically limitless, 
impacting “whatever area [he] feels he wants to be active in.”200  He has taken 
on “the iron issues” such as the economy, national security, and energy 
concerns, and he has become the “go-to guy on the Hill,” where he presses 
through President Bush’s legislative proposals.201  Even Cheney himself 
acknowledges that he spends “more time on executive matters than legislative 
matters.”202  While he technically has responsibilities in the Senate, he 
predominantly focuses on his responsibilities in the White House.203 
Cheney’s influence in the Executive Branch is unlike that of any of his 
predecessors.  While he has no direct constitutional authority in the Executive 
Branch, Cheney receives great deference from Bush’s advisors.204  Attorney 
General John D. Ashcroft once observed, “When [Cheney] talked, everybody 
would listen.”205  Similarly, journalist Barton Gellman noted that at meetings 
without the President, Cheney is “the only one everyone stands up for when he 
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walks into the room.”206  Crossing Cheney has even cost some officials their 
jobs—a lesson learned all too well by Treasury Secretary Paul H. O’Neill after 
he opposed Cheney on his proposal to cut taxes.207 
Cheney is usually the last person to speak to Bush before he makes final 
decisions.208  But Cheney also has a substantial say in what the President hears 
first.  Whereas previous Vice Presidents enjoyed a standing invitation to join 
the President during cabinet meetings, Cheney has intervened at the cabinet 
and sub-cabinet levels, even in the President’s absence.209  At these meetings 
he acts not only as a sounding board, but also as a filter, rejecting options that 
he deems infeasible even before they reach the President’s doorstep.210 
Occasionally, Cheney is the only person to talk to Bush before he makes a 
decision.  Two months after the attacks on September 11, 2001, Cheney 
convinced Bush over the course of their weekly luncheon to sign an executive 
order that denied foreign terrorism suspects access to any court hearing.211  
Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice were reportedly enraged to discover that they had not been consulted on 
such a major decision that affected both foreign policy and national security.212  
Similarly, Attorney General John Ashcroft felt that as the President’s senior 
law enforcement officer, in charge of terrorism prosecutions nationwide, he 
should have had some input before the order was signed.213  John C. Yoo, a 
deputy chief of the Office of Legal Counsel, argued that “[t]he issue we dealt 
with was: Can the president do it constitutionally? . . . [The State Department] 
wouldn’t have views on that.”214  But the Vice President did, and apparently he 
was the only high ranking official to voice his opinion to the President.215 
In other matters, it would seem that Cheney bypasses the President 
altogether.  When the chairmen and ranking minority members of the 
intelligence committees were summoned to the White House for their first 
briefing on government eavesdropping in the wake of 9/11, they were led 
immediately to the Vice President’s office.216  Under previous Presidents, 
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conversations of such gravity would at least have involved the Commander in 
Chief.217  Similarly, Cheney has made his office a “hub of tax policy.”218  He 
met with Federal Reserve Chairman Allen Greenspan more often than 
Greenspan met with President Bush.219  R. Glenn Hubbard, Bush’s former 
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers stated, “I’d have conversations 
with [Cheney] that were at a level of detail that those with the president were 
not.”220 
B. What the People Wanted 
Cheney has represented himself as a member of the Executive Branch 
politically in two ways.  First, he adds “gravitas” to the Bush 
Administration.221  President Bush did not select Dick Cheney as his running 
mate to win Wyoming’s three electoral votes.222  As Bush has explained, “I 
picked him because he is without a doubt fully capable of being president of 
the United States.”223  But it is doubtful that Americans were considering 
Cheney’s presidential qualifications when they voted for Bush.224  The people 
voted for the Bush/Cheney ticket because they saw in Cheney what was 
needed in Bush to run the White House: experience.  Bush has even 
acknowledged this: “I’m basically a media creation.  I’ve never done anything.  
I’ve worked for my dad.  I worked in the oil business.  But that’s not the kind 
of profile you have to have to get elected to public office.”225  Voters would 
not be happy with a “media creation” running the country.  They needed and 
expected Cheney to be the President’s right hand man in the White House.  
Pundits promised voters that Cheney would be “a prime minister with helping 
to set up the White House, setting an agenda and dealing with Congress.”226  
Indeed, at the Republican National Convention in 2000, Cheney stated, “I am 
glad to be back in the arena,” referring not to the upcoming campaign, but to 
the White House itself.227 
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Second, Cheney answers to only one person: the President.228  In this way, 
he is politically like a member of the President’s staff.  Members of the 
Legislature answer directly to the people who elect them and must constantly 
worry about how they appear to the public.  Cheney, however, seems to care 
little about how he is perceived by the public or portrayed by the media.229  
Having no presidential aspirations of his own,230 approval ratings in the teens 
do not seem to affect Cheney’s decision making.231  Certainly, Cheney was 
elected in the manner prescribed by Article II and the Twelfth Amendment.  
But, as Professor Goldstein has pointed out, “Even though some citizens are 
influenced by the vice-presidential candidates it would be inaccurate to 
conclude that the Vice President is really elected.”232  Rather, he was 
effectively appointed by Bush, following the tradition of approval by a 
relatively passive convention.233 
C. The Supreme Court Determines Cheney Is Part of the Executive Branch 
By all accounts Cheney is a secretive man,234 and he has refused to turn 
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made Cheney Chairman of the National Energy Policy Development Group in 
2001, the Government Accountability Office asked Cheney to identify the 
industry officials with whom his group had met.236  Cheney refused to release 
their names, stating: “[T]his request that in fact we’re suppose[d] to provide 
[Congress] with this information with respect to . . . those meetings in the 
Executive Branch between the Vice President and other individuals strikes me 
as—as inappropriate . . . .”237  Executive power, he argued, should remain free 
from the interference of other branches.238 
The resulting Supreme Court case239 had the potential to answer key 
questions regarding the Vice President’s role in the Executive Branch.  Cheney 
argued that his communications with the President were protected by the 
principle of separation of powers.240  Anticipating that his opponents would 
capitalize on the dual nature of the Vice Presidency, Cheney had stated in a 
letter to Congress, “[W]hile the Vice President is the President of the Senate, 
he also has executive duties and responsibilities in support of the President, as 
the Congress has by law recognized.”241  Additionally, Cheney emphasized his 
role in the Executive Branch as a close confidant to the President.242  Cheney 
even relied on the Recommendations Clause and the Opinion Clause, two 
constitutional provisions strictly limited to Article II and the Executive Branch, 
in order to protect his discussions with the President.243 
 
 236. See id. 
 237. Nightline: A Conversation with Dick Cheney (ABC television broadcast July 25, 2001). 
 238. Brief for the Petitioners at 30–31, Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (No. 
03-475). 
 239. Cheney, 542 U.S. 367. 
 240. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 238, at 12 (“[T]he legislative power and judicial 
power cannot be utilized to require the Vice President to disclose to private litigants the substance 
or the details of the process by which a President obtains information and advice from the Vice 
President, heads of departments and agencies, and assistants to the President in the exercise of 
powers committed exclusively to the President by the Constitution . . . .”). 
 241. Letter from Richard Cheney to the House of Representatives and the Senate (Aug. 2, 
2001), reprinted in 147 CONG. REC. S10,447 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2001). 
 242. See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 238, at 12; see also id. at 25–26 (arguing that the 
Vice President is in fact acting on behalf of the President, and therefore, the same considerations 
that would preclude action against the President would preclude action against the Vice 
President). 
 243. Id. at 37.  Despite popular belief, Cheney never officially argued that he was entitled to 
executive privilege.  See e.g., Robinson, supra note 211 (“Didn’t Cheney claim executive 
privilege as his reason for keeping secret the process he followed in developing the 
administration’s energy policy . . . ?”).  In fact, the Court in Cheney v. United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia held that Cheney did not have to assert executive privilege to 
prevent Congress’s broad discovery requests in a civil suit.  Cheney, 542 U.S. at 388.  Cheney 
believed that the separation of powers doctrine was sufficient protection for his communications 
with the President.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 238, at 31 (“Congress cannot ‘inquire 
into matters which are within the exclusive province’ of the Executive . . . . This is true, 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
306 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:281 
The Supreme Court agreed with Cheney, using language that repeatedly 
“lump[ed] the vice presidency together with the presidency.”244  The Court 
determined, “These separation-of-powers considerations should inform a court 
of appeals’ evaluation [of a case] involving the President or the Vice 
President.”245  Elsewhere the Court referred to Cheney as a person who is in 
the “closest operational proximity to the President.”246  The Court also 
explicitly rejected any argument based on cases that did not involve senior 
members of the Executive Branch as “altogether misplaced.”247  “Were the 
Vice President not a party in the case,” the Court admitted, “the argument . . . 
might present different considerations.”248  Cheney won his case: in the eyes of 
the Supreme Court, Vice Presidents are members of the Executive Branch. 
CONCLUSION 
Vice President Cheney’s argument that he is not an “entity within the 
executive branch” fails for several reasons.  First, Cheney’s reliance on the 
Founders’ original intentions for the office has been superseded by the new 
wisdom of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  While the Founders may have 
originally believed that the primary duties of the Vice President—as President 
of the Senate—were legislative, their reasons for creating the office were 
purely executive.  The main purpose of the Vice President was to ensure that 
the proper President would be elected.  The secondary purpose was to provide 
for a means of succession.  The methods prescribed in the original Constitution 
to meet these objectives were flawed and led to major problems for a young 
democracy.  With the advantage of hindsight, the Twelfth Amendment 
corrected the mode of election, and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment corrected the 
mode of succession.  Although they were exceedingly wise, the Founding 
Fathers were anything but clairvoyant.  Cheney is truly mistaken if he believes 
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that we should rely on the Founding Fathers’ original vision of the Vice 
Presidency in light of all the problems it created. 
Second, Cheney’s argument fails to account for the transformation of the 
office, especially over the past century.  To meet the growing needs of a strong 
Executive, the Vice Presidency has migrated into the Executive Branch.  Vice 
Presidents have steadily assumed a greater role as presidential advisors, 
ambassadors, and confidants.  They have chaired significant executive posts 
and regularly attended presidential cabinet meetings where they have 
influenced key policy decisions.  With an office physically located in the West 
Wing, Vice President Cheney has spent less time on Capitol Hill and more 
time in the White House at the President’s disposal.  As Jon Stewart put it, 
“[Saying that Cheney is part of the Legislative Branch is] like the Harlem 
Globetrotters saying they were part of Scooby and the Gang, even though they 
only showed up once at a haunted amusement park and once on some 
Christmas special that doesn’t even count!”249 
Finally, Cheney’s argument fails because he himself successfully 
convinced the Supreme Court that the Vice President is a member of the 
Executive Branch.  As the supreme interpreters of the Constitution, the Court 
has held that an overbroad discovery request made by the Legislative Branch 
in a civil suit against the Vice President violates the principle of separation of 
powers.250  Because there are only three branches of government, and the Vice 
President is obviously not in the Judicial Branch, he necessarily belongs in the 
Executive Branch.  As one reporter observed, “He can’t possibly argue that 
he’s part of neither branch.”251  If Cheney truly believed that he were not a part 
of the Executive Branch, then he would have to assume that the Court was 
incorrect in its assessment of his own argument that he is an executive official. 
Thus, the current office of the Vice President is firmly rooted within the 
Executive Branch, despite Cheney’s best arguments to the contrary.  While 
Cheney has been criticized by some as being one of the most reprehensible 
political figures in the history of the nation,252 he deserves some credit for 
expanding the office of the Vice Presidency—an institution which has become 
an increasingly vital part of the government over the past one hundred years.  
Credit also belongs to President George W. Bush, whose willingness to 
delegate authority has given Cheney a proper home in the White House.  But 
the majority of credit belongs to Cheney’s predecessors during the last century, 
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whose vision of the Vice Presidency provided Cheney with the tools he needed 
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